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ABSTRACT 
 
 
BRADLEY P. LINDSEY:  A Value Relevance Examination of the Current Leasing Standard 
(Under the direction of Wayne Landsman and Edward Maydew) 
 
    In the wake of the prominent accounting scandals of the past several years, investors and 
standard setters are demanding increased corporate transparency.  Nowhere is the demand for 
transparency more salient than with off-balance-sheet financing, of which lease accounting 
plays a major role.  At the end of 2004, total rental commitments by U.S. firms from off-
balance-sheet operating leases exceeded $1 trillion.  As standard setters reconsider leases as 
part of their broad reexamination of off-balance-sheet financing, they do so without the 
benefit of empirical research documenting whether capital market participants find the 
current leasing standard value relevant.  This paper examines whether as-if capitalized 
operating lease liabilities and capital lease liabilities are both relevant and sufficiently 
reliable to be priced and explores whether equity investors value operating and capital leases 
differently.  The results are consistent with the market viewing both operating and capital 
leases as economic liabilities of the firm.  However, the results also indicate that capital 
market participants price operating and capital lease liabilities differently, consistent with the 
bright-line tests of the current leasing standard identifying economic differences in operating 
and capital leases.  Thus, continuing to require lease disclosures by different lease 
classifications would assure that equity investors will not suffer from a loss of value relevant 
information in the pricing of leases. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
    This paper examines the value relevance of operating and capital leases to investigate 
whether equity investors price operating lease disclosures in the notes to the financial 
statements differently than capital lease amounts recognized on the balance sheet.  Ever since 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13 “Accounting for Leases” (SFAS 13) 
became effective in 1976, leases that meet certain criteria have been required to be 
capitalized on the balance sheet, creating both a capital lease asset and a capital lease 
liability.1  Leases not meeting any of the capitalization criteria under  
SFAS 13 are classified as operating leases, resulting in an annual rental expense over the 
lease term and the disclosure of rental commitments related to future years in the notes to the 
financial statements.2   
    At the end of 2004, total rental commitments by U.S. firms from off-balance sheet 
operating leases equaled $1.05 trillion.3  Had these operating lease rental commitments been  
                                                 
1 The FASB issued SFAS 13 in 1976 requiring retroactive capitalization of all capital leases.  In order to allow 
sufficient time for lessees with numerous lease contracts to analyze existing lease arrangements and to provide 
an opportunity for lessees to settle contractual violations resulting from the SFAS 13 capitalization criteria, the 
SEC required implementation of SFAS 13 by firm fiscal year-ends beginning in December 1978. 
 
2 The appendix provides a brief summary of the lease classification criteria in SFAS 13 as well as a simple 
example illustrating the differing accounting treatment for operating and capital leases. 
 
3 This is a conservative estimate of the extent of operating lease activity, comprising only minimum operating 
lease rental commitments from the footnote disclosures of publicly-traded firms with nonmissing leasing 
variables available in Compustat.  In addition, the operating leases of private firms as well as contingent rental 
payments (percentage of sales or profits) and lease renewal options are also excluded from this total as 
prescribed under SFAS 13.   
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capitalized,  I estimate that the as-if capitalized operating lease liabilities for U.S. firms at the 
end of 2004 would exceed $625 billion.  In comparison, long-term debt for U.S. firms totaled 
more than $6.5 trillion at the end of 2004.  Accordingly, operating lease rental commitments 
that remain off the balance sheet account for approximately nine percent of corporate debt.  
Utilizing a conservative estimate that all missing observations in Compustat represent no 
leasing activity, more than 86 percent of firms listed on Compustat entered into operating 
lease transactions with little variation across industries.  Thus, not only does operating lease 
activity generate significant cash outlays but these data suggest that operating leases are 
pervasive.   
    The magnitude of leasing undertaken as operating leases dwarfs that undertaken as capital 
leases.  At the end of 2004, the total amount of capital lease liabilities recognized by 
publicly-traded firms was $89.8 billion or $16.2 million per firm.  In contrast to operating 
leases, only 36 percent of firms report capital lease liabilities with the frequency varying 
from 17 to 52 percent of firms across industries as measured by one-digit SIC codes.  Simply 
comparing the relative magnitudes of operating and capital lease activity reveals that 
approximately 85 percent of leasing obligations take place under leases that avoid the lease 
capitalization criteria of SFAS 13.    
    Concern over the magnitude and pervasiveness of leases, as well as the role of lease 
accounting in alleged corporate accounting scandals, resulted in the requirements for 
expanded lease disclosure in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Specifically, Section 401 mandates 
increased disclosure of contractual obligations including capital and operating leases in the 
management discussion and analysis portion of public filings.  In Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress 
also expressed concern over rules-based accounting standards and directed the Securities and 
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Exchange Commission (SEC) to study the feasibility of moving to principle-based standards.  
The lease capitalization criteria in SFAS 13 are perhaps the most often mentioned examples 
of rules-based standards.  
    In addition to requiring increased disclosure, Section 401 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also 
called upon the SEC to conduct a study on the extent of off-balance sheet arrangements and 
whether current financial statements transparently reflect the economics of off-balance sheet 
arrangements.  In its report recently issued to the President of the United States and to 
Congress to satisfy this legislatively mandated requirement, the SEC recommended that “the 
FASB should undertake a project to reconsider the standards for accounting for leases.”4  To 
support this recommendation, the SEC states that “the current ‘all or nothing’ lease 
accounting guidance is not designed to reflect the wide continuum of lease arrangements that 
are used, and therefore, it cannot transparently and consistently reflect the varying economics 
of the underlying arrangements.”   
    The FASB appears to be keenly aware of the current uneasiness associated with leasing 
transactions and related off-balance sheet activities.  In January 2003, the FASB addressed 
some off-balance sheet arrangements by issuing Interpretation No. 46 “Consolidation of 
Variable Interest Entities” (FIN 46).5  However, basic off-balance sheet financing, including 
operating lease transactions that do not require a special purpose entity (SPE), have not yet 
been re-evaluated.  The FASB Board members, industry representatives, and academic 
                                                 
4 The SEC issued the “Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 On Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special Purpose Entities, and Transparency of 
Filings by Issuers” on June 15, 2005.  
 
5 In December 2003, the FASB issued FASB Interpretation No. 46 (revised December 2003), Consolidation of 
Variable Interest Entities (FIN 46R), which broadens the rules surrounding whether firms should consolidate an 
entity.  FIN 46R replaced FASB Interpretation No. 46, Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities, and provided 
clarification on how the new consolidation rules should be applied and when they should be implemented by 
various entities. 
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participants that comprise the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC) 
recently prioritized in the 2005 FASAC survey the five specific, standard-setting 
recommendations identified by the SEC in its June 2005 report.  FASAC members ranked 
lease accounting as the second most important standard-setting priority of the SEC 
recommendations, and FASB Board members ranked lease accounting as the third most 
important standard-setting priority.  In a recent Wall Street Journal article (Lease Accounting 
Draws Scrutiny; November 18, 2005), the FASB’s chairman Robert Herz stated that the 
FASB “will decide early next year whether to add a formal project on lease accounting to its 
agenda.”  Mr. Herz also added that “if approved, the project he envisions would be ‘a 
comprehensive relook at the whole model’ for lease accounting, which he said hasn’t had a 
major overhaul since 1976.”    
    As standard setters gauge whether to reconsider SFAS 13 and the accounting for leases, 
they do so without the benefit of empirical research documenting whether capital market 
participants find the current leasing standard value relevant.6  To fill this gap, my paper 
explores whether operating lease disclosures and recognized capital lease amounts under 
SFAS 13 are both relevant and sufficiently reliable to be priced, and if so, whether the market 
values operating and capital leases differently.  In order to test my hypotheses, I construct an 
as-if capitalized operating lease liability measure by discounting firms’ future operating lease 
rental commitment amounts with a firm-specific discount rate.  The results show a negative, 
significant relation between as-if capitalized operating lease liabilities and market value of 
equity.  Likewise, the results reflect a negative, significant relation between capital lease 
liabilities and market value of equity.  Thus, the market seems to view both disclosed 
                                                 
6 Imhoff et al. (1993) document that equity investors incorporate operating lease disclosures in the airline and 
retail grocery industries into risk assessments over a six year period from 1984 to 1990.  Additionally, Ely 
(1995) investigates whether the market views operating leases as property rights in assessing equity risk. 
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operating lease commitments and recognized capital lease liabilities as economic liabilities of 
the firm.  However, the results also indicate that the market prices as-if capitalized operating 
lease liabilities and recognized capital lease liabilities differently, consistent with the current 
leasing standard identifying economically different leases.  Specifically, the pricing multiple 
on the capital lease liability is significantly greater in magnitude than the pricing multiples on 
the as-if capitalized operating lease liability and long-term debt.  In addition, I find that the 
pricing multiple on the as-if capitalized operating lease liability is not significantly different 
from the pricing multiple on long-term debt.  
    This paper makes three contributions to the existing literature.  First, it affirms that lease 
accounting under SFAS 13 is value relevant, equipping standard setters with empirical 
evidence of the current leasing standard as they reconsider lease accounting.  Second, it 
documents that operating and capital leases are priced differently, assisting standard setters in 
crafting a new leasing standard.  Specifically, requiring capitalization of all leases would 
result in a loss of information to investors if recognized lease amounts and the associated 
footnote disclosures were merely aggregated across all lease classifications.  Third, this paper 
utilizes descriptive evidence on the magnitude of as-if capitalized operating lease debt to 
explain in part why firms appear underlevered.  In particular, researchers have evaluated 
firms’ capital structures to assess if firms are more highly leveraged to enjoy the favorable 
tax benefits of debt as compared to equity (Graham 2000 among others).  This paper raises 
the question whether all debt, of which operating leases comprise a sizable portion, has been 
accounted for in examining the relation between debt and marginal tax rates. 
    The paper proceeds as follows:  Section 2 provides a review of prior lease accounting 
research and develops the hypotheses; Section 3 describes the research design; Section 4 
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summarizes the sample selection and descriptive statistics; Section 5 presents the empirical 
findings; and Section 6 concludes the study.  An appendix provides a brief summary of the 
lease classification criteria under SFAS 13 and illustrates the differences in accounting for 
operating and capital leases.  
   
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
    Leasing occurs when the user of an asset is not the most efficient owner of an asset.  
Independent of the required accounting treatment, a lease commits firms to cash outlays in 
the future in exchange for the right to use an asset.  For many firms, these commitments are 
substantial sums that span many years.  The issuance of SFAS 13 resulted in the formation of 
certain criteria (bright-line thresholds) that determine lease classification.  These leasing 
criteria establish whether the future cash outflows attributable to a lease and the use of a 
related lease asset are recognized on the balance sheet as a capital lease asset and liability, or 
whether the cash flows are disclosed in the notes to the financial statements as future rental 
expense related to an operating lease. 
    Researchers have utilized the leasing arena to address a number of important research 
questions; however, the value relevance of operating and capital leases under SFAS 13 
remains an unresolved question in the literature.7  To address this question, my paper 
explores whether operating lease disclosures and recognized capital lease amounts are both 
relevant and sufficiently reliable to be priced.  An understanding of the relevance and 
reliability of operating and capital leases and an assessment of whether operating lease 
disclosures and recognized capital lease amounts are priced differently under the current 
leasing standard may prove useful to standard setters should SFAS 13 be re-evaluated.   
                                                 
7 Ge (2005) finds that greater off-balance-sheet operating lease activity leads to lower future earnings and 
documents that investors fail to fully anticipate this finding. 
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    Prompted by the prominent accounting scandals of the past several years, standard setters 
are focusing on corporate transparency.  With respect to leasing, there is evidence that 
managers use operating leases to achieve off-balance sheet financing, avoiding the lease 
capitalization criteria of SFAS 13 (El-Gazzar et al. 1986, Imhoff et al. 1988).8  Indeed, a 
large and specialized leasing industry has developed over time, supported by accountants and 
attorneys adept at navigating the accounting and tax rules for leases.  While SFAS 13 has 
survived for more than twenty-nine years, it has come under increased scrutiny as a result of 
the perceived growing manipulation of financial statements using leases.   
    Surprisingly, despite Sarbanes-Oxley and the emphasis on increased transparency and 
improved accounting standards, over a trillion dollars of operating lease rental commitments 
remain off corporate balance sheets.  A Wall Street Journal article describes the current 
leasing landscape as follows (How Leases Play A Shadowy Role In Accounting; September 
22, 2004):  “U.S. companies are still allowed to keep off their balance sheets billions of 
dollars of lease obligations . . . The practice spans the entire spectrum of American business 
and industry, relegating a key gauge of corporate health to obscure financial statement 
footnotes, and leaving investors and analysts to do the math themselves. . . [T]he special 
accounting treatment for many leases means that a big slice of corporate financing remains in 
the shadows.  For all the tough laws and regulations set up since Enron Corp’s 2001 collapse, 
regulators have left lease accounting largely untouched.” 
    Determining whether investors and analysts peer into the “shadows” to value as-if-
capitalized operating lease liabilities is an empirical question.  Numerous value relevance 
                                                 
8 Additionally, two lessor accounting empirical studies (Powers and Revsine 1989, Johnson et al. 1993) 
examine the incentive managers have to overestimate residual values so they can front-load income under either 
operating or capital lease accounting.  In his review piece, Lipe (2001) notes that he knows of no other 
empirical research studies on lessor accounting. 
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studies have established a significant relation between accounting disclosures and the market 
value of equity, (Landsman 1986, Barth 1991, Aboody 1996, Ayers, 1998 among others) 
consistent with these accounting amounts being relevant to equity investors and sufficiently 
reliable to be priced.  Specific to leasing, researchers have found evidence that investors 
appear to adjust risk for operating lease disclosures (Bowman 1980, Ely 1995, Imhoff et al. 
1993, Marston et al. 1988) and to account for off-balance sheet operating leases in the pricing 
of debt (Lim et al. 2005).  To equity investors, the relevance of leases seems likely given the 
pervasiveness and sheer magnitude of leases.  However, the reliability of a current leasing 
disclosure that aggregates lease commitments for one to five years into the future and a lump 
sum amount beyond five years is uncertain. 
    Reliability plays a key role in equity investors’ valuation of accounting amounts.  Barth et 
al. (2003) develop a theoretical recognition and disclosure model and find that recognition of 
a highly unreliable accounting amount can result in greater price informativeness.  
Specifically, they find that reliability relative to relevance is more important than reliability 
per se.  Thus, as limited as the operating lease disclosures are under SFAS 13, the relevance 
of leases given their sheer magnitude and pervasiveness may very well translate into 
investors pricing a relatively unreliable disclosure. 
    Assuming that equity investors view capital lease liabilities and as-if capitalized operating 
lease liabilities as economic liabilities of the firm, I make the following predictions (stated in 
alternative form): 
Hypothesis 1a:  Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relation between capital 
lease liabilities and the market value of equity. 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relation between as-if 
capitalized operating lease liabilities and the market value of equity. 
 
 10
    In addition to investigating whether operating and capital lease liabilities are value 
relevant, I examine whether operating and capital lease liabilities are priced differently.  
Some FASB Board members and FASAC members have called for increased transparency 
and the capitalization of all leases (see FASAC surveys 2002 – 2005).  International standard 
setters have proposed the capitalization of all lease assets and liabilities included in lease 
contracts (Lipe 2001).  The popular business press echoes these same sentiments as well 
(WSJ September 22, 2004; WSJ November 18, 2005).  If operating and capital leases are 
priced differently, standard setters should also consider maintaining lease classifications for 
recognized amounts on the balance sheet and disclosed amounts in the notes to the financial 
statements.  Otherwise, aggregating capital and operating lease financial statement 
information would result in a loss of information to investors (Lev 1968, Lev 1970 among 
others).     
    Anecdotal evidence suggests that managers navigate the current rule-based leasing 
standard to achieve the desired leasing treatment (Imhoff et al. 1988, Altamuro 2005).  Thus, 
managers are afforded the option of hugging-up against the bright-line tests of SFAS 13 
without triggering the lease capitalization requirement.  Alternatively, the bright-line tests of 
the rule-based leasing standard could capture real economic differences in leasing activity.9  
It is possible that the SFAS 13 lease criteria tend to capitalize some types of assets more 
frequently than others, which could introduce real economic differences between capitalized 
and operating lease liabilities merely from the underlying leased assets.  For example, a lease 
                                                 
9 Graham et al. (1998) investigates the theoretical relation between marginal tax rates and lease classifications.  
The results show a negative, significant relation between true (operating) leases and marginal tax rates.  With 
respect to financing (capital) leases, they find no relation with marginal tax rates and attribute the result to 
measurement error between tax and financial reporting lease classifications.  Morsfield (2004) finds the 
hypothesized relation between both lease types and marginal tax rates in a private sample containing the actual 
tax lease classifications.  Marginal tax rates may explain some of the pricing differences between operating and 
capital leases, but I suffer from the same measurement error issue as Graham et al. (1998) with financial 
accounting lease classifications. 
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term that equals or exceeds 75 percent of the economic life of land is impossible because 
land has an indefinite life, whereas a lease term that exceeds 75 percent of the economic life 
of computer equipment is likely given the rapid obsolescence of such equipment.  
Additionally, real property assets are more likely to appreciate in value than shorter-lived 
assets such as equipment.  Thus, there is greater likelihood that the present value of the 
minimum lease payments of leased equipment would exceed 90 percent of the fair value at 
lease inception than would be true of a leased building.  As such, economic characteristics of 
the underlying lease assets influence the accounting lease classification.    
    The lease classification criteria under SFAS 13 are intended to capture the economic 
effects of ownership, because “a lease that transfers substantially all of the benefits and risks 
of ownership … is similar, in many respects, to that of an installment purchase.”  Capital 
leases by definition result from lessees holding a leased asset for 75 percent or more of the 
remaining economic life of the asset or for a sufficiently long period of time that the lessor 
recoups at least 90 percent of its fair value at lease inception during the lease term.10  Thus, 
capital lease liabilities reflect relatively longer lease terms and could price differently than a 
relatively shorter operating lease life because of the longer investment horizon.   
    In addition to the investment horizon, underlying leased assets that tend to appreciate in 
value potentially result in economically different lease arrangements then those that 
depreciate in value.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that a large fraction of assets such as land 
and buildings that are leased result in operating lease treatment.  These assets tend to 
appreciate on average.  If a relatively larger fraction of operating leases consists of 
                                                 
10 The economic life capitalization criterion is waived if the leased asset is in the last quartile of its economic 
life. 
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appreciating assets as compared to capital leases, equity investors could price as-if 
capitalized operating lease liabilities and capital lease liabilities differently.11 
    Under SFAS 13, only minimum lease payments are included in the capital lease liability 
and disclosed operating lease rental commitments.  These amounts include non-contingent 
rental payments over the lease term, residual value guarantees, and any penalties paid for 
failure to renew the lease.  To the extent the minimum lease payments understate the true 
economic lease liability because of contingent lease payments and lease renewal options, the 
pricing of as-if capitalized operating lease liabilities and capitalized lease liabilities could 
differ if contingent lease payments and lease renewal options reflect leasing transactions with 
one lease type more than the other.12 
    Accordingly, I make the following prediction (stated in alternative form): 
Hypothesis 2:  Ceteris paribus, there is a significant difference between the 
pricing multiple on the as-if-capitalized operating lease liability and the 
market value of equity and the pricing multiple on the capital lease liability 
and the market value of equity.
                                                 
11 Accordingly, residual value guarantees inserted into lease contracts to protect lessors from use and 
maintenance decisions of the lessees (Smith and Wakeman 1985) may be priced differently by equity investors 
depending on the probability of whether and how much the underlying lease asset appreciates or depreciates.   
 
12 Generally, potential lessor and lessee bankruptcy should not result in pricing differences between operating 
and capital leases.  Lessees are protected from lessor bankruptcies under both the old and new bankruptcy law 
(October 2005).  Likewise, under the new and old lessee bankruptcy law, lessees have a specified period of time 
after filing bankruptcy to assume or reject lease contracts.  The amount of time allotted depends on whether the 
underlying lease asset is commercial, personal, or residential property. 
   
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
    Investigating the value relevance of disclosed operating lease rental commitment amounts 
and whether operating and capital lease liabilities are priced differently requires an 
estimation of the as-if capitalized operating lease liability.  In addition, failure to include an 
estimation of the operating lease asset in the model specification results in an omitted 
correlated variable, resulting in the coefficient on the as-if capitalized operating lease liability 
capturing the net economic effect of operating lease activity.  Because capital lease assets are 
included in the model, the coefficient on the capital lease liability reflects solely the 
economic effect of the liability.  Thus, I cannot compare the pricing of the as-if capitalized 
operating lease liability and the capital lease liability without an estimation of the as-if 
capitalized operating lease asset.   
 
3.1   Estimating the As-if Capitalized Operating Lease Asset and Liability 
    To examine the value relevance of operating versus capital lease liabilities, I construct an 
as-if capitalized lease liability for firms’ operating leases.  Estimating the as-if capitalized 
operating lease liability (OPLEASL) requires a discount rate.  As a departure from other 
studies (Imhoff et al. 1993, Graham et al. 1998) that assume a cross-sectional constant 
discount rate over the sample period, I construct a firm-specific discount rate to reduce 
measurement error.  SFAS 13 requires firms to discount capital leases using the lesser of the 
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lessee’s incremental borrowing rate or, if known, the lessor’s implicit return on the lease 
contract.13  In practice, the lessor’s implicit rate of return on the lease is rarely known by the 
lessee.  Thus, I estimate the lessees’ incremental borrowing rate or firm-specific discount rate 
by dividing total interest expense by average total debt each year from 1994 through 2004 
and computing the equal-weighted mean for each firm.  For lump sum rental commitments, I 
compute the firm-specific equal-weighted mean rate that the rental commitments increase or 
decrease in years one through five (data items 96, 164-167) and apply that rate to the lump 
sum rental commitments beyond the fifth year.  OPLEASL equals the sum of the discounted 
rental commitment amounts due in one, two, three, four, and five years as well as the 
discounted rental commitment amounts estimated in six years and beyond. 
    As noted previously, estimating the as-if capitalized operating lease liability poses a 
problem because of potential measurement error.  To calibrate my operating lease 
capitalization methodology, I hand-collected a small sample of rental commitments for 
capital lease liabilities that exceeded $25M in 2001 and 2002.  With the capital lease rental 
commitment amounts hand-collected from the Form 10-K, I can compare the capital lease 
amounts capitalized using my methodology with the actual reported capital lease liabilities.  
Assuming the payment streams of capital lease rental commitments mirror that of operating 
lease rental commitments, I can evaluate the amount of measurement error in my estimation 
methodology.  
    To illustrate the methodology I use to estimate the as-if capitalized operating lease 
liability, consider the discount electronics retailer Best Buy and the following rental 
                                                 
13 Although the lessee rarely knows the lessor’s rate of return on a lease contract, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that economic factors such as market interest rates, perceived lessee credit risk, lessor competition, asset 
collateral quality, and asset re-marketing prospects are some of the inputs into the lease terms and pricing 
function of lessors. 
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commitments disclosed in its Form 10-K for the 2002 fiscal year as well as the computed 
percentage decrease in the rental commitment amounts by year: 
 
 Year  Rental Commitment Amount ($M)  % Increase (Decrease) 
 2003    472.00      
 2004    459.00     (2.75) 
  2005    417.00     (9.15) 
  2006    376.00     (9.83) 
2007    361.00     (3.99) 
Thereafter           2,698.00     (6.43) 
 
 
I assume that the thereafter portion of the rental commitments are paid out at the equal-
weighted annual mean rate of increase or decrease as the year one through year five rental 
commitment amounts.  For example, rental commitments in year two reflect a 2.75 percent 
decrease compared to the rental commitments in year one [(459 – 472) /472)].   The equal-
weighted annual mean rate of increase or decrease applied to the thereafter or lump sum 
rental commitment amount is -6.43 percent [(-2.75 + -9.15 + -9.83 + -3.99)/4].14  Best Buy’s 
equal-weighted mean discount rate from 1994 through 2004 equals 7.207 percent.  The as-if 
capitalized operating lease liability (OPLEASL) is the present value of all of the rental 
commitment cash outflows as follows: 
 
 Year         Rental Commitments ($M)        7.207% PV Factor     PV of Cash Flows 
2003   472.00    .9322   440.00 
2004   459.00    .8701   399.38 
2005   417.00    .8115   338.40 
2006   376.00    .7570   284.63 
2007   361.00    .7061   254.90 
2008              337.79               .6586    222.47 
2009   316.07                       .6143   194.55 
…   …    …   …  
2018   147.62    .3284    48.48  
  
Estimated operating lease liability                        3,066.45   
                                                 
14 I assume all payments occur at the end of each year.   
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    Developing a methodology to estimate the accompanying as-if capitalized operating lease 
asset is more challenging than estimating the as-if capitalized operating lease liability.  
Calculating an approximation of the as-if capitalized operating lease asset requires drawing 
inferences about the weighted average total life of leased assets, the   weighted average 
remaining life of leased assets, and the appropriate weighted average depreciation method 
from the scheduled cash outflows.  However, failure to estimate the operating lease asset 
translates into an omitted correlated variable in the regression model specification and makes 
comparing the pricing of capital lease liabilities and the as-if-capitalized operating lease 
liability a futile exercise. 
    To compute the as-if-capitalized operating lease asset, I first estimate the linear 
combination of net capital lease asset book value as a function of capital lease rental 
commitments in years 1 through 5 and the lump sum amount beyond year 5.  These values 
are from the same hand-collected sample used to calibrate the as-if capitalized operating 
lease liability calculation.  This step is detailed below in equation one as follows: 
CAPLEASAit = β0 + β1CLRC1it + β2CLRC2it + β3CLRC3it + β4CLRC4it  
 
+ β5CLRC5it + β6CLRCLSit + eit           (1) 
where CLRCn equals capital lease rental commitments in years 1 through 5 for firm i at time 
t, CLRCLS equals the capital lease rental commitment lump sum amount beyond year 5 for 
firm i at time t, and CAPLEASA equals the net book value of capital lease assets for firm i at 
time t.  I utilize this vector of estimated rental commitment coefficients to compute an as-if 
capitalized operating lease asset as illustrated in equation two below: 
OPLEASAit = 0Bˆ + 1Bˆ OLRC1it + 2Bˆ OLRC2it + 3Bˆ OLRC3it + 4Bˆ OLRC4it  
 
 + 5Bˆ OLRC5it + 6Bˆ OLRCLSit             (2) 
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where OLRCn equals operating lease rental commitments in years 1 through 5 for firm i at 
time t, OLRCLS equals the operating lease rental commitment lump sum amount beyond year 
5 for firm i at time t, and OPLEASA equals the estimated net book value of operating lease 
assets for firm i at time t. 
    This estimation methodology implicitly assumes that operating and capital lease assets 
have the same depreciation methods and that the discount rate used under SFAS 13 for 
financial reporting purposes is equivalent.  Additionally, I presuppose that parameter 
estimates from the hand-collected sample can be extended to all of the firms in the cross-
section over the sample period.  To the extent these assumptions do not hold, the as-if 
capitalized operating lease asset is measured with error.  I focus my study on an examination 
of operating and capital lease liabilities and include the estimated operating lease asset 
amount in the adjusted book value of equity variable.  
 
3.2 Empirical Specification   
    Because balance sheet treatment is central to lease accounting, the main tests in this paper 
employ a model specification that expresses value as a function of earnings and book value 
(balance sheet) information similar to the framework developed by Ohlson (1995).15  This 
approach has been used widely in the literature; examples include Aboody (1996), Collins et 
al (1997),  Barth et al (1998), Aboody et al (1999), and Kallapur et al. (2004) among others.  
Furthermore, I benefit from research by Barth et al. (1999, 2005) who disaggregate 
accounting data to explore whether disaggregated accounting data have incremental 
explanatory power to equity book value and net income.  I also have the advantage of 
drawing upon several prior studies that examine the value relevance of other obligation-
                                                 
15 Similar to Barth et al. (1998) and Kallapur et al. (2004), I do not rely on the Ohlson model (1995) as a basis 
for my predictions because of its limiting assumptions such as linear information dynamics. 
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related disclosures such as deferred tax liabilities (Amir et al. 1997, Ayers 1998, Givoly et al. 
1992) and pension obligations (Barth 1991, Barth et al. 1992).    In particular, I utilize the 
following regression framework: 
MVEit = β0CONSTANTit + β1BVEit + β2NIit + β3NEGit + β4NEGNIit  
 
  + β5CAPLEASLit + β6DEBTit + β7OPLEASLit + β8GROWTHit  
 
+ β9ΣYEARit + β10ΣINDUSTRYit + eit    (3) 
 
where i and t denote firms and years, respectively.  MVE equals market value of common 
equity, CONSTANT equals one divided by common shares outstanding, BVE is the book 
value of equity adjusted to exclude capital lease liabilities and long-term debt and to include 
the estimate for the as-if capitalized operating lease asset (OPLEASA) and the deferred tax 
asset created by capitalizing operating leases computed with Graham’s (1996) computed 
marginal tax rates (MTR), NI equals earnings after discontinued and extraordinary items, 
NEG is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-year observations with a net loss, NEGNI 
is an interaction variable (NEG*NEGNI), CAPLEASL is the capital lease liability, DEBT 
equals long-term debt less capital lease liabilities (CAPLEASL), OPLEASL equals the 
estimated as-if capitalized operating lease liability, GROWTH  is the year ahead sales 
revenue,  ΣYEAR is a categorical variable equal to one if the firm-year observation is a given 
year and zero otherwise, and ΣINDUSTRY is a categorical variable equal to one if the firm-
year observation is in a given one-digit SIC code and zero otherwise.16   
    To allow for lease-specific information from the annual report to be impounded in price, 
the dependent variable MVE equals the market value of common equity three months after 
the fiscal year-end.  NEGNI is intended to capture the differential pricing effects of firms 
                                                 
16 Controlling for growth options is supported by the Ohlson (1995) model as the inclusion of other information 
relevant to investors.  In addition to incorporating growth options, the one year ahead sales amount potentially 
controls for scale issues in this model specification (Barth et al. 1996).     
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with net losses as documented in Hayn (1995).  Defining NI as net income after extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations satisfies the clean surplus assumption of the Ohlson 
model.  It should be noted that I am unable to compute the net income effects of the as-if 
capitalized operating lease liability and net them against the operating lease expense in a 
firm-year.  As such, in the valuation equation, the implicit assumption is that the net income 
effects are zero.  Assuming a ten to 20 year lease term and discount rate of eight to twelve 
percent, the net income effects of capitalizing an operating lease are zero between 55 and 59 
percent of the original useful life of the asset (Imhoff et al. 1991 and 1997).17  Thus, the no 
income effect assumption inherent in my regression specification seems reasonable if firms 
in the cross-section have roughly constant levels of leasing activity.    
    In order to establish a baseline to compare the pricing of the as-if capitalized operating 
lease liability and the capital lease liability, I break out long-term debt (DEBT) from book 
value of equity in the model specification (equation 3).  Moreover, if long-term debt is priced 
differently than the capital lease liabilities, I can triangulate my results with additional 
empirical evidence that aggregating operating and capital lease data may result in an 
information loss to investors.  To control for heteroskedasticity, I report t-statistics that 
reflect White-adjusted (1980) standard errors.  Also, I include industry and year fixed effects 
to control for industry-specific effects and time-specific macro-economic effects, 
respectively.  In order to control for potential scale issues, I deflate all of the regression 
variables by common shares outstanding. 
                                                 
17 These amounts assume no down payment on the lease and straight-line depreciation. 
   
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
   
    In order to apply my as-if capitalized operating lease asset estimation methodology, I 
hand-collect a sample of capital lease intensive firms with disclosed capital lease rental 
commitment amounts and capital lease asset net book values.  The hand-collected sample 
also allows me to calibrate my estimation of the as-if capitalized operating lease liability.  
For the hypothesis tests, I utilize Compustat to compile a representative sample of the 
economy to test the relations between lease liabilities and the market value of equity.  The 
sample selection and descriptive statistics for both samples are detailed below. 
 
4.1 Hand-collected Sample Selection and Summary Statistics 
    The sample consists of firm-year observations from 2001 to 2002 pertaining to Compustat 
firms with at least $25 million of capital lease liabilities (data item 84).  Using the 2001 and 
2002 Form 10-Ks, I hand-collected the net book value of capital lease asset information as 
well as the capital lease rental commitment amounts for years 1 through 5 and the lump sum 
rental commitments beyond year 5.  Panel A in Table 1 summarizes the sample selection 
criteria.  There are 613 firm-year observations with the minimum threshold of $25 million or 
more in capital lease liabilities and positive total assets and sales.  Deleting firm-year 
observations attributable to foreign firms and American Depository Receipts (199), regulated 
firms such as utilities and insurance companies (64), real estate investment trusts (10), 
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missing shares outstanding and price per share variables (44), missing firm-year observations 
attributable to capital asset data in the Form 10-K (77), missing capital asset accumulated 
depreciation data in the Form 10-K (28), missing rental commitment observations (17), 
negative shareholder’s equity balances (20) and influential observations identified as 
studentized residuals greater than three from the Belsley et al. (1980) criteria (6) results in a 
final sample of 148 firm-year observations.   
    Panel B in Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics for the estimated capital lease liability 
computed using the as-if capitalized operating lease liability methodology employed in the 
paper as well as the actual reported capital lease liability amount (data item 84) for the 148 
hand-collected sample firm-year observations.  The actual and estimated amounts from both 
distributions are strikingly similar suggesting that the combination of the estimated discount 
rate and the underlying assumption about the rate the lump sum capital lease rental 
commitment amounts are realized estimate the capital lease liability accurately.  Thus, it 
appears that my method for estimating the as-if capitalized operating lease liability is sound 
and yields reliable results.   
    The as-if capitalized operating lease asset methodology implies that in the cross-section 
operating and capital leases have the same accounting discount rate when applying SFAS 13.  
In order to test the reasonableness of this assumption, Panel C displays the operating lease 
and capital lease rental commitment amounts by disclosed category for the hand-collected 
sample.  The percentages of rental commitments in each category across both lease 
classifications are quite similar, but the percentage of capital lease rental commitments are 
slightly more front-loaded than the operating lease rental commitments.  Panel C is indirect 
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evidence that operating leases have longer lease terms, suggesting that operating leases are 
attributable on average to longer-lived assets.18 
    Panel D presents the regression results for equation one.  The high R-squared of 98.46 
percent suggests that the rental lease commitment amounts capture almost all the variation in 
the capital lease asset net book value.  Thus, if operating and capital leases have similar 
discount rates and are subject to similar depreciation methods, OPLEASA should be a 
reasonable estimate of the as-if capitalized operating lease asset. 
 
4.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis Testing  
    I use Compustat data to examine the value relevance of as-if capitalized operating lease 
liabilities and capital lease liabilities as well as the pricing differences between these 
variables.  Included in the main sample are firm-year observations from 2000 through 2003 
for Compustat firms with positive net sales revenue (data item 12) and $10 million or more in 
total assets (data item 6).  In order to compute the as-if capitalized lease amounts, disclosed 
amounts in the footnotes to the financial statements under SFAS 13 are needed.  Specifically, 
data for rental commitments one to five years in the future (data items 96, 164-167), the 
disclosed lump sum amount for rental commitments more than five years into the future (data 
item 389), and an estimated discount rate computed as the equally-weighted mean percentage 
of interest expense to total debt for the years 1994 through 2004 serve as the relevant inputs 
into the computations.  The equal-weighted mean discount rate over the 11-year period from 
1994 through 2004 is used because current year leasing amounts are influenced by prior year 
lease investment decisions.  The sample begins in 2000 because the thereafter portion of 
operating lease rental commitments (data item 389) is not reliably collected and included in 
                                                 
18 The data are also consistent with operating leases being subject to larger and/or an increased percentage of 
residual value guarantees. 
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Compustat prior to that year.  The GROWTH variable is defined as one-year-ahead sales 
which eliminates 2004 from the sample.  Additionally, the effects of FIN 46 could potentially 
confound the results in 2004. 
    Table 2 summarizes the sample selection criteria.  I remove foreign firms from the sample 
to assure that I am testing the valuation relevance of SFAS 13 and not an international 
leasing standard.  Real estate investment trust (REIT) firm-year observations are deleted 
from the sample because of unique institutional features including no corporate level taxation 
and substantial distribution requirements.  Utilities are removed because of regulatory 
incentives, as well as the fact that operating leases are not included in the rate base.  I also 
remove firm-year observations for insurance companies because of regulatory incentives.  
Financial institutions are deleted for regulatory incentives, as well as the fact that Compustat 
does not compile capital lease liability data for banks.  I exclude firm-year observations with 
negative shareholder’s equity because my valuation model specification may not apply to 
these firms and to be consistent with prior research (Collins et al. 1997).   
    After deleting firm-year observations attributable to foreign firms and American 
Depository Receipts (3,832), real estate investment trusts (828), regulated firms such as 
utilities (663), insurance companies (509), and financial institutions (336), missing shares 
outstanding data (1,217) missing share price data (1,023), missing operating lease rental 
commitment amount data (4,227), missing capital lease liability data (528), missing long-
term debt data (6), negative shareholder’s equity balances (648), missing one-year-ahead 
sales revenue data (357), missing marginal tax rate data (351), and influential observations 
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identified from the Belsley et al. (1980) criteria (68), the final sample is comprised of 9,985 
firm-year observations.19   
    Panel B of Table 2 presents the industry and year representation in the sample.  The four-
year sample period is represented almost equally by the four years in the sample period.  
Dividing the sample into one-digit SIC Codes, Panel B of Table 2 and Table 3 characterize 
the industry representation in the sample and compare it to the industry representation for the 
Compustat economy from 2000 through 2003 for the 24,578 firm-year observations that have 
positive net sales revenue and $10 million or more in total assets.  The sample representation 
is lower for SIC 6 due to deleted REIT, insurance and financial institution firm-year 
observations.  Likewise, the sample contains fewer SIC 4 observations because of deleted 
electric and natural gas utility firm-year observations.  Table 3 also illustrates that substantial 
leasing activity is prevalent in the transportation industry (SIC 4 with a capital and operating 
lease mean liability of $60.97M and $479.63M respectively) and the wholesale and retail 
industries (SIC 5 with a capital and operating lease mean liability of $25.30M and $315.53M 
respectively).   
    Table 4 illustrates the balance sheet and financial statement ratio effects of capitalizing 
operating lease assets and liabilities.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that financial accounting 
incentives, including enhanced performance and leverage ratios, result in managers 
navigating the bright-line tests of SFAS 13 to avoid the capitalization criteria.  Accordingly, 
Table 4 presents an aggregated sample balance sheet for all 349 firms in the wholesale and 
retail industry (SIC 5) at the end of the 2003 fiscal year.  The reported total assets, total 
liabilities, and total equity amounts are provided.  Utilizing the as-if capitalized operating 
                                                 
19 Specifically, I delete firm-year observations with studentized residuals in excess of the absolute value of 
three. 
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lease asset and liability methodologies detailed in the paper, over $121 million of liabilities 
and over $112 million of assets escape balance sheet treatment.  Thus, operating leases 
explain in part why firms appear to be underlevered (Graham 2000).  Assuming the same 
lease classification for tax purposes as financial reporting purposes, firms trade off deferred 
tax deductions for avoiding debt classification on the balance sheet for financial reporting 
purposes.20 
    The tax adjustment noted in Table 4 illustrates this trade-off.  Specifically, a tax 
adjustment is made (over $2.7 million) to account for a deferred tax asset resulting from 
interest and depreciation tax deductions that exceed lease expense deductions utilizing firm-
specific marginal tax rates (MTR).  Factoring in the tax adjustment and assuming that all net 
income effects take place in prior years, stockholder’s equity is reduced by over $5 million.   
    Utilizing simplified measures of return on assets, return on equity, debt, and debt-to-equity 
ratios, the reported amounts result in a higher aggregated return on assets measure,  a lower 
aggregated debt-to-asset ratio, and a lower aggregated debt-to-equity ratio.  Ignoring net 
income effects, the return on equity measure is higher because of the reduction in equity from 
capitalizing operating leases.  Thus, Table 4 supplies empirical evidence that in the 
aggregate, wholesale and retail sample firms in 2003 enjoyed enhanced performance and 
leverage ratios from operating lease activity.   
    Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the main regression variables in equation three, 
as well as for variables used to compute the regression variables.  Despite deflating by 
common shares outstanding, the regression variables have skewed distributions as evidenced 
by different means and medians.  Additionally, the magnitude and dispersion of operating 
                                                 
20 This is a crude assumption given the use of the synthetic leasing structure to achieve capital lease treatment 
for tax purposes (increased tax deductions from depreciation and interest in the early life of the lease) and 
operating lease treatment for financial reporting purposes (less debt and assets on the balance sheet). 
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leases compared to capital leases differ markedly.  The mean (median) of the as-if capitalized 
operating lease liability (OPLEASL) is $1.85M ($0.51M) compared to $0.12M ($0.00M) for 
the capital lease liability.  The variables used to compute the as-if capitalized operating lease 
liability are also presented in Table 5.  The estimated discount rate appears reasonable with a 
mean (median) estimate of 0.089 (0.073) percent.  Also, Table 5 includes descriptive 
statistics for the as-if capitalized operating lease asset (OPLEASA).  The mean ($1.51M) and 
median ($0.02M) values for OPLEASA are less than the corresponding mean ($1.85M) and 
median ($0.51M) values for OPLEASL, which is expected given that lease liability amounts 
exceed lease asset amounts except at lease inception and lease termination when these 
amounts are generally equal.  Thus, these lease descriptive statistics affirm that the as-if 
capitalized operating lease asset and liability estimation methodologies employed in the 
paper appear reasonable.  I include the Stockholder’s Equity and MTR descriptive statistics as 
a barometer for the size and magnitude of the BVE variable and all variables that are 
subtracted from and added to Stockholder’s Equity (data item 216). 
    Correlations among the regression variables for the regression model specification detailed 
in equation one are presented in Table 6.  The Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients 
detailed in Table 6 are all significantly different from zero at a significance level of five 
percent with the exception of three correlation coefficients that are bolded.  Generally, it 
appears that firm investments in leasing capital and debt capital result in an increased market 
value of equity.   The correlation between the dependent variable, MVE, and capital lease 
liability, CAPLEASL, has a different sign in the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficient 
specification highlighting the need for multivariate regression analysis.
   
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
    In order to examine the value relevance of operating and capital leases, I utilize the 
multivariate regression model specification developed in equation three.  Results are reported 
in Table 7.  All t-statistics are computed using White-adjusted (1980) standard errors from 
the consistent, recomputed variance covariance matrix.   
    As a comparison to the equation three regression results presented in the final column, I 
include additional model specifications to provide for varying levels of aggregation of the 
three debt variables.  Specifically, ALLDEBT is defined as the summation of all long-term 
debt (DEBT), capital lease liabilities (CAPLEASL), and the as-if capitalized operating lease 
liability (OPLEASL).  LEASEDEBT equals capital lease liabilities (CAPLEASL) plus the as-if 
capitalized operating lease liability (OPLEASL).  NONCAPLEASL equals long-term debt 
(DEBT) summed with the as-if capitalized operating lease liability (OPLEASL).  Lastly, 
NONOPLEASL equals long-term debt increased by capital lease liabilities (CAPLEASL).  In 
addition to providing robustness checks of the model specification in equation three, the 
differing levels of data aggregation allow me to more directly evaluate and triangulate my 
tests for the second hypothesis comparing the pricing multiples on the capital lease liabilities 
(CAPLEASL) and the as-if capitalized operating lease liability (OPLEASL).   
    In all of the model specifications, the 9,985 firm-year observations identified in Table 2 
are used.  In each model, BVE is adjusted to reflect the appropriate disaggregated debt 
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variables.  The coefficient estimates on BVE range from 0.85 to 0.87 (t-statistics equal or 
exceed 17.02).  Like BVE, the parameter estimates for NI exhibit little variation with values 
ranging from 0.50 to 0.53 (t-statistics equal or exceed 2.47).  The low magnitudes of the NI 
variable and accompanying low values of the t-statistics likely reflect the losses incurred by 
many firms during and surrounding the recession in the sample period.  It should be noted 
that the model specification assumes no net income effects on average from operating lease 
capitalization.  Also, in every model specification, the interaction variable NEGNI 
approximates the magnitude of NI (-0.61 to -0.63) providing evidence that net loss firms are 
valued differently than profitable firms (Hayn 1995).  Lastly, the parameter estimate for 
GROWTH ranges from 0.02 to 0.03.  The t-statistics are all positive and significant at the five 
percent level. 
    Combining all debt, the coefficient on ALLDEBT equals -0.90 with an associated t-statistic 
of -19.48.  Thus, on average, for every dollar per share of financial statement debt the market 
value of equity decreases by $0.90 per share.  Separating out each firm’s debt into lease 
(LEASEDEBT) and non-lease amounts (DEBT), the coefficient on lease debt equals -1.04 (t-
statistic = -14.35) as compared to the coefficient on non-lease debt of -0.86 (t-statistic = -
17.42).  These parameter estimates are significantly different from each other at the five 
percent significance level.  Disaggregating capital lease debt (CAPLEASL) from long-term 
debt and the as-if capitalized operating lease liability (NONCAPLEASL) results in parameter 
estimates that are significantly different from each other at the five percent significance level.  
Referring to Table 7, the parameter estimate on CAPLEASL equals -2.03 (t-statistic = -6.25) 
contrasted with the parameter estimate of -0.88 (t-statistic = -19.21) for NONCAPLEASL.   
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    With the as-if capitalized operating lease asset and liability included in BVE, I can assess 
whether equity investors price capital lease liabilities and long-term debt the same.  
Combined, the parameter estimate for NONOPLEASL equals -0.88 (t-statistic =  
-15.92).  When capital lease liabilities are disaggregated from long-term debt, the result is a 
parameter estimate of -2.08 (t-statistic = -6.17) for CAPLEASL and a coefficient of  
-0.87 (t-statistic = -16.20) for long-term debt (DEBT) suggesting that equity investors utilize 
footnote disclosures to price capital lease liabilities and long-term debt differently.21  These 
variables are significantly different from each other at the significance level of five percent.  
Solely separating out the as-if capitalized operating lease liability (OPLEASL) results in a 
parameter estimate of -1.02 (t-statistic = -12.79).   
    Turning to the focal point of the study, consider the model specification from equation 
three presented in the final column.  In this specification, all three debt variables are 
disaggregated.  The parameter estimate for capital lease liabilities (CAPLEASL) equals -1.86 
(t-statistic -5.31).  DEBT has a coefficient of -0.86 (t-statistic = -17.26).  Additionally, the 
parameter estimate for the as-if capitalized operating lease liability (OPLEASL) is -0.95 (t-
statistic = -13.31).  Using a Chi-Square distribution with White-corrected standard errors, the 
probability that OPLEASL and CAPLEASL are equal is 1.70 percent.  Also, the probability 
that DEBT and CAPLEASL are equal is 0.32 percent.  Lastly, the probability that DEBT and 
OPLEASL are equal is 26.59 percent signifying that equity investors view long-term debt and 
as-if capitalized operating lease liabilities as economically similar on average. 
    Given the empirical findings, I find evidence consistent with equity market participants 
viewing capital lease liabilities and the as-if capitalized operating lease liability as economic 
                                                 
21 It should be noted that some capital lease intensive firms report capital lease assets and/or capital lease 
liabilities on the balance sheet disaggregated from property, plant, and equipment and long-term debt, 
respectively. 
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liabilities of the firm similar to long-term debt.  As limited as the current operating lease 
disclosures may be, it appears that investors, in addition to pricing the recognized capital 
lease liabilities, deem the operating lease disclosures adequately relevant and reliable to be 
impounded in price.  The results also provide empirical evidence that capital lease liabilities 
and the as-if capitalized operating lease liabilities are priced differently.  Thus, as standard 
setters contemplate whether and how best to revisit SFAS 13, they should consider the 
potential harm of aggregating data.  Continuing to require lease disclosures by different lease 
classifications would assure that equity investors do not suffer from a loss of value relevant 
information in order to price leases. 
 
5.1  Robustness Tests 
    The results presented in Table 7 provide evidence consistent with operating and capital 
leases being priced differently by equity investors.  As a robustness test, I examine whether 
firms with capital leases are fundamentally different than firms without capital leases.  Table 
8 presents descriptive statistics for regression variables by dividing the sample based on 
whether CAPLEASL is positive or equal to zero.  Of the 9,985 firm-year observations in the 
main sample, 3,384 firm-year observations represent firms with capital leases and 6,601 
observations represent firms that not.  Comparing the means in each subsample, the 
differences in means of the regression variables are statistically insignificant.  In order to 
evaluate whether firms with capital leases price operating leases differently than firms 
without capital leases, I create a categorical variable CAPOP that is equal to one if 
CAPLEASL is positive and zero otherwise.  Additionally, CAPOPEASL is an interaction 
variable equal to CAPOP*OPLEASL.  The regression results are presented in column one of 
Table 9.  The coefficient on the variable CAPOPLEASL equals -0.22 with a statistically 
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insignificant t-statistic of -1.67.  However, the probability that operating and capital leases 
are priced the same for firms with both operating and capital leases increases to 10.48 
percent. 
    As a second robustness test, I examine the pricing of operating and capital leases for the 
transportation industry (SIC = 4), the most lease-intensive industry.  Results for the most part 
mirror the main sample.  The probability that operating and capital leases are priced the same 
equals 1.98 percent.  The third robustness test is motivated by FIN 46.  Already-existing 
synthetic lease transactions were subject to the revised consolidation rules under FIN 46 
beginning at the end of 2003.  In the third column, I evaluate my model specification for the 
first three years of the sample period from 2000 through 2002.  Again, the results for this 
third robustness test in column three are similar to the column one results.  The probability 
that operating and capital leases are priced the same equals 0.43 percent.  The coefficient on 
CAPOPLEASL equals -0.18 with a statistically insignificant t-statistic of -1.15.  The 
associated probability that operating and capital leases are priced the same by firms with both 
leases equals 2.33 percent.  Comparing the results from sample period with and without 
2003, firm-year observations from 2003 increased the probability from 2.33 percent to 10.48 
percent that operating and capital leases are priced the same by firms with both operating and 
capital leases.  Thus, it appears that future research could evaluate how FIN 46 affected the 
pricing of operating and capital leases.
   
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
    The vast majority of leasing activity by publicly traded U.S. firms escapes capitalization 
under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.  In the wake of the alleged corporate 
accounting abuses the past several years, off-balance sheet financing, including operating 
lease accounting under SFAS 13, has come under increased scrutiny.  Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the summer of 2002, which mandated the SEC to evaluate and report 
on the extent of off-balance sheet financing.  In its report dated June 15, 2005, the SEC 
recommended that the FASB reconsider SFAS 13, concluding that they believe “that the 
potential benefits in terms of increased transparency of financial reporting would be 
substantial enough to justify the time and effort required.”   
    As standard setters assess whether to re-evaluate SFAS 13 and the lease capitalization 
criteria, they do so without the benefit of empirical research examining whether capital 
market participants find the current leasing disclosure value relevant.  The purpose of this 
paper is to help fill that void by documenting the value relevance of capital lease liabilities 
and current operating lease disclosures.   
    The results show a negative, significant relation between capital lease liabilities and the 
market value of equity. In addition, I construct an as-if capitalized operating lease liability 
and examine the relation between operating lease activity and market value.  The results 
show a negative, significant relation between operating lease activity and the market value of 
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equity consistent with equity investors viewing as-if capitalized operating lease liabilities and 
capital lease liabilities as true economic liabilities of the firm.  Moreover, the results provide 
evidence that current lease disclosures, as limited as they may be, supply sufficiently relevant 
and reliable information to be impounded into price by investors.  The results also show that 
equity investors price operating and capital lease liabilities differently.  Thus, should the 
FASB require the capitalization of all leases, separate (and hopefully enhanced) leasing 
disclosures by lease classification would assure that equity investors do not suffer from a loss 
of valuation relevant information in the pricing of leases.  
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Appendix: 
Review of Lease Capitalization Criteria 
    A capital lease is defined as any noncancelable lease meeting one or more of the following 
four bright-line tests (SFAS 13 paragraphs 6-7): 
1.  Transfer of Ownership.  The lease transfers ownership to the lessee by the end of 
the lease term. 
2.  Bargain Purchase Option.  The lease contains a bargain purchase option.  
Specifically, a bargain purchase option is defined as the lessee having the option to purchase 
leased property for a price sufficiently lower than the expected fair value of the property on 
the date the option vests such that exercise of the option is reasonably assured. 
3.  75 Percent of Economic Life.  The lease term equals or exceeds 75 percent of the 
estimated economic life of the leased property.   
4.  90 Percent of Asset’s Value.  The present value at the beginning of the lease term 
of the minimum lease payments to be paid to the lessor equals or exceeds 90 percent of the 
leased asset’s value to the lessor at the inception of the lease. 
    Capital leases are capitalized using the lower of the lessee’s incremental borrowing rate or 
the lessor’s rate of return on the lease if known.  In addition, leased assets that are classified 
as capital leases because they meet the transfer of ownership or bargain purchase option 
criteria are depreciated over the useful life of the asset whereas leased assets that are 
classified as capital leases because they meet the 75 percent of economic life or 90 percent of 
asset value criteria are depreciated over the life of the lease term.     
    Leases that are not capitalized under SFAS 13 are classified as operating leases, resulting 
in an annual rental expense in the year incurred and disclosure of the rental commitments in 
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the notes to the financial statements.  Operating lease disclosures summarize the rental 
commitments or amounts to be paid out in one to five years followed by a lump sum amount 
which aggregates the rental commitments beyond five years.  Thus, by obtaining operating 
lease treatment and assuming the underlying economic need for constant or increasing lease 
activity, performance and leverage ratios can be enhanced.  A brief example of operating and 
capital lease accounting follows. 
    Consider a lease agreement consummated at the end of year 0 that consists of five annual 
payments of $10,000 at the end of each year.  Assume the appropriate discount rate is 10 
percent.  Detailed below are the journal entries for both an operating lease and a capital lease 
over the lease term, assuming straight line depreciation.   
 
      Operating Lease   Capital Lease  
Year 0      No Entry    Capital Lease Asset 37,908 
            Capital Lease Liab.  37,908 
 
Year 1  Rent Expense 10,000   Depreciation Expense  7,582 
   Cash  10,000  Interest Expense  3,791 
       Capital Lease Liab.  6,209 
        Accumulated Dep.  7,582 
        Cash    10,000 
 
Year 2  Rent Expense 10,000   Depreciation Expense  7,582 
   Cash  10,000  Interest Expense  3,170 
       Capital Lease Liab.  6,830 
        Accumulated Dep.  7,582 
        Cash    10,000 
 
Year 3  Rent Expense 10,000   Depreciation Expense  7,582 
   Cash  10,000  Interest Expense  2,487 
       Capital Lease Liab.  7,513 
        Accumulated Dep.  7,582 
        Cash    10,000 
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Year 4  Rent Expense 10,000   Depreciation Expense  7,581 
   Cash  10,000  Interest Expense  1,736 
       Capital Lease Liab.  8,264 
        Accumulated Dep.  7,581 
        Cash    10,000 
 
Year 5  Rent Expense 10,000   Depreciation Expense  7,581 
   Cash  10,000  Interest Expense     909 
       Capital Lease Liab.  9,091 
        Accumulated Dep.  7,581 
       Cash    10,000 
 
Panel A:  Hand-collected Sample Selection Criteria
Compustat firms in 2001 and 2002 with more than $25M in capital lease obligations 613
Less the following firm-year observations:
American Depository Receipts/Foreign Firms 199
Utilities (Electric and Natural Gas) 55
Missing Shares Outstanding or Share Price Data 44
Real Estate Investment Trusts 10
Insurance Companies 9
Missing Capital Asset Data in the Form 10-K 77
Missing Capital Asset Accumulated Depreciation Data 28
Missing Rental Commitment Amounts 17
Negative Shareholder's Equity Balances 20
Influential Observations - Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) 6 465
Total Firm-Year Observations in Subsample 148
Panel B:  Calibration of the Estimated As-if Capitalized Operating Lease Liability
Capital Lease Liability N Mean St. Dev. 10% Median 90%
Reported 148 208.88 457.16 31.76 63.88 466.76
Estimated* 148 211.09 482.39 30.67 61.30 486.91
* The estimated capital lease liability distribution reflects the as-if capitalized operating lease 
liability methodology applied to hand-collected capital lease amounts of the same variables.  
Table 1:
Estimation of The Operating Lease Asset and Liability
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Panel C:  Total Rental Commitments by Disclosed Lease Classification Categories
N
Amount ($M) Percentage Amount ($M) Percentage
Year 1 148 33,274 9.55% 5,620 11.00%
Year 2 148 30,753 8.83% 5,198 10.18%
Year 3 148 28,829 8.28% 4,671 9.15%
Year 4 148 27,025 7.76% 4,065 7.96%
Year 5 148 24,852 7.13% 3,606 7.06%
Lump Sum Amount 148 203,612 58.45% 27,917 54.66%
Total Rental Commitments 148 348,345 100.00% 51,077 100.00%
Panel D:  Estimation of the Operating Lease Asset with Capital Lease Data
CAPLEASA it  = β 0  + β 1 CLRC1 it + β 2 CLRC2 it  + β 3 CLRC3 it + β 4 CLRC4 it 
+ β 5 CLRC5 it  + β 6 CLRCLS it + e it             [1]
0.9846
148
CLRCi  = capital lease rental commitments in years 1 through 5 for firm i at time t
CLRCLS = the capital lease rental commitment lump sum amount beyond year 5 for firm i at time t
CAPLEASA  = the net book value of capital lease assets for firm i at time t
Operating Leases Capital Leases
Variables Coefficient t -statistic
Intercept -11.8789 -2.02
CLRC1 -0.4659 -0.92
CLRC2 1.3633 2.31
CLRC3 0.4079 0.58
0.7441 0.74
CLRC5 5.4924 6.55
Table 1:
Estimation of The Operating Lease Asset and Liability
Observations
CLRCLS 0.0136 0.33
R2
CLRC4
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Panel A:  Sample Selection Criteria
Compustat firm-year observations in years 2000 through 2003 with 
     positive net sales revenue and $10 million or more in total assets 24,578
Less the following firm-year observations:
American Depository Receipts/Foreign Firms 3,832
Real Estate Investment Trusts 828
Utilities (Electric and Natural Gas) 663
Insurance Companies 509
Financial Institutions 336
Missing Shares Outstanding Data 1,217
Missing Share Price Data 1,023
Missing Operating Lease Rental Commitment Amount Data 4,227
Missing Capital Lease Obligation Data 528
Missing Long-term Debt Data 6
Negative Shareholder's Equity Balances 648
Missing One-year Ahead Sales Revenue Data (GROWTH ) 357
Missing Marginal Tax Rate Data 351
Influential Observations - Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) 68 14,593
Total Firm-Year Observations in Sample 9,985
Panel B:  Industry and Year Sample Representation
Year N Percentage SIC Code N Percentage
2000 2,452 24.56% 0 32 0.32%
2001 2,522 25.26% 1 526 5.27%
2002 2,553 25.57% 2 1,733 17.36%
2003 2,458 24.62% 3 3,167 31.72%
Total 9,985 100.00% 4 600 6.01%
5 1,402 14.04%
6 422 4.23%
7 1,537 15.39%
8 529 5.30%
9 37 0.37%
Total 9,985 100.00%
Table 2:
Sample Selection Criteria and Industry and Year Sample Representation
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Op. Lease Cap Lease
SIC Industries N Percentage N Percentage Mean ($M) Mean ($M)
0 Agriculture 97 0.39% 32 0.32% 86.88 2.06
1 Mining/Construction 1,370 5.57% 526 5.27% 44.70 2.07
2 Food/Chemicals 3,776 15.36% 1,733 17.36% 79.36 4.56
3 Manufacturing 6,394 26.02% 3,167 31.72% 49.10 3.03
4 Transportation 2,784 11.33% 600 6.01% 479.63 60.97
5 Wholesale/Retail 2,625 10.68% 1,402 14.04% 315.53 25.30
6 Finance/Insurance/Real Estate 2,818 11.47% 422 4.23% 160.49 4.38
7 Services 3,582 14.57% 1,537 15.39% 88.52 3.22
8 Services 1,028 4.18% 529 5.30% 59.48 3.16
9 Administration 104 0.42% 37 0.37% 760.17 4.20
Whole Sample 24,578 100.00% 9,985 100.00% 131.48 9.95
This table illustrates the industry representation in the sample compared to the Compustat database.
The Compustat sample consists of firm-year observations from years 2000 through 2003 that have
positive net sales revenue and $10 million or more in total assets . See Table 2 for the sample 
selection criteria that resulted in the final sample in the paper.  As-if capitalized operating lease and 
capital lease mean liabilities are presented by one-digit SIC codes for the sample.
Compustat Sample
Table 3:
Observations by Industry
Sample and Compustat Industry Concentration
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Reported Total Assets 604,210 Reported Total Liabilities 350,093
Operating Lease Assets 112,818 Operating Lease Liabilities 121,033
Operating Lease Tax Adjustment 2,731
Adjusted Total Liabilities 471,126
Reported Stockholder's Equity 254,117
Reported Net Income in SE 33,453 *
Reduction in Stockholder's 
Equity From Operating Leases (5,484) *
Adjusted Stockholder's Equity 248,633
Adjusted Total Liabilities and
Adjusted Total Assets 719,759 Stockholder's Liabilities 719,759
Aggregated Sample Ratios
* I assume in computing ratios for this example that all net income effects take place in prior years.  The
operating lease tax adjustment reflects reduced income taxes (computed using the firm-specific marginal
tax rate) attributable to depreciation and interest expense amounts that exceed lease expense amounts.
**  The simplified ratios have the following definitions:     ROA = Net Income/Total Assets
ROE = Net Income/Total Equity     D/A = Total Liabilities/Total Assets     D/E = Total Debt/Total Equity
ROA
ROE
Debt-to-Asset
Debt-to-Equity
57.94%
137.77%
4.65%
13.45%
65.46%
189.49%
Reported Amounts** Adjusted Amounts
5.54%
13.16%
Table 4:
Aggregated Wholesale and Retail Sample Firms In Year 2003 (SIC = 5, n = 349)
Balance Sheet
Last Day of 2003 Fiscal-Year
Balance Sheet and Financial Statement Ratio Effects of Capitalizing Operating Leases
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Variables N Mean St. Dev. 10 Percent Median 90 Percent
Regression Variables:
MVE 9,985 14.67 14.54 1.49 10.14 34.05
CONSTANT 9,985 0.08 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.19
BVE 9,985 13.45 20.26 0.48 8.15 30.60
NI 9,985 -0.36 19.72 -1.77 0.21 1.80
NEG 9,985 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
NEGNI 9,985 -1.07 19.57 -1.77 0.00 0.00
CAPLEASL 9,985 0.12 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.16
DEBT 9,985 4.85 11.87 0.00 1.00 12.72
OPLEASL 9,985 1.85 5.65 0.06 0.51 4.03
GROWTH 9,985 21.63 35.75 1.00 10.81 50.58
Variables Used to Compute Regression Variables:
OLRC1 9,985 0.42 1.01 0.02 0.15 1.01
OLRC2 9,985 0.37 0.97 0.02 0.12 0.87
OLRC3 9,985 0.32 0.89 0.01 0.10 0.74
OLRC4 9,985 0.27 0.83 0.00 0.07 0.62
OLRC5 9,985 0.24 0.86 0.00 0.06 0.51
OLRCLS 9,985 1.24 6.82 0.00 0.10 2.13
Discount Rate 9,985 0.089 0.071 0.038 0.073 0.152
OPLEASA 9,985 1.51 6.19 0.00 0.02 3.50
Stockholder's Equity 9,985 7.45 8.18 0.93 5.39 16.08
MTR 9,985 0.243 0.130 0.021 0.329 0.350
Table 5:
Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables
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Variable Definitions:
MVE = market value of common equity three months after the fiscal year-end
CONSTANT = one divided by common shares outstanding
BVE = book value of total stockholder's equity increased by CAPLEASL , DEBT , OPLEASA, 
    and the deferred tax asset from capitalizing operating leases  (OPLEASL - OPLEASA)*MTR
NI = net income after extraordinary and discontinued items (Compustat data item 172)
NEG = categorical variable equal to one if NI is negative and zero otherwise
NEGNI = interaction variable equal to NI*NEG
CAPLEASL =  capital lease obligations (Compustat data item 84)
DEBT = long-term debt less CAPLEASL
OPLEASL = estimated as-if capitalized operating lease liability
GROWTH = one-year ahead actual total net sales (Compustat data item 12)
OLRCi = operating lease rental commitment in years 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 (Compustat data items 96,164-167)
OLRCLS = operating lease rental commitment lump sum amount beyond year 5 (Compustat data item 389)
Discount Rate = the estimated firm-specific discount rate
OPLEASA = estimated as-if capitalized operating lease asset
Stockholder's Equity = total stockholder's equity (Compustat data item 216)
MTR = the computed firm specific marginal tax rate (Graham 1996)
All variables are deflated by common shares outstanding.  All dollar amounts are in millions.
Table 5:
Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables
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Variables MVE BVE NI NEGNI CAPLEASL DEBT OPLEASL GROWTH
MVE 1.0000 0.6005 0.5588 0.3898 -0.0601 0.3106 0.3112 0.4550
BVE 0.4257 1.0000 0.3790 0.2067 0.1027 0.7195 0.6377 0.7386
NI -0.1294 -0.1770 1.0000 0.8879 -0.0543 0.2601 0.1951 0.4621
NEGNI -0.1614 -0.2032 0.9943 1.0000 -0.0708 0.1454 0.0906 0.3359
CAPLEASL 0.0288 0.3795 -0.0287 -0.0322 1.0000 0.1160 0.1853 0.0977
DEBT 0.2555 0.8537 -0.1922 -0.2098 0.1884 1.0000 0.4152 0.5881
OPLEASL 0.1199 0.6121 -0.1182 -0.1275 0.5053 0.3010 1.0000 0.6528
GROWTH 0.2809 0.5242 0.0022 -0.0187 0.2234 0.3905 0.3860 1.0000
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are presented under (over) the diagonal for variables in the 
regression model specification.  Correlation coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
significance level of five percent unless they are bolded.  See Table 5 for variable definitions.
Table 6:
Pearson and Spearman Correlation Coefficients
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      + β 9ΣYEAR it  + β 10ΣINDUSTRY it  + e it                                                   (3)                                   
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Variables t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic
CONSTANT ? -7.15 -6.92 -6.94 -15.18 -15.06 -15.08 -6.87
-2.51 -2.44 -2.44 -5.79 -5.79 -5.79 -2.43
BVE + 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.86
19.43 20.73 19.83 17.02 18.30 20.41 20.35
NI + 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.51
2.50 2.50 2.47 2.49 2.47 2.49 2.47
NEG ? -6.75 -6.71 -6.69 -6.71 -6.61 -6.64 -6.68
-24.19 -24.79 -24.14 -23.57 -23.63 -24.61 -24.32
NEGNI - -0.63 -0.62 -0.61 -0.62 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61
-2.98 -2.99 -2.95 -2.98 -2.97 -3.00 -2.96
ALLDEBT - -0.90
-19.48
LEASEDEBT - -1.04
-14.35
NONCAPLEASL - -0.88
-19.21
NONOPLEASL - -0.88
-15.92
CAPLEASL - -2.03 -2.08 -1.86 *
-6.25 -6.17 -5.31
DEBT - -0.86 -0.87 -0.86 *
-17.42 -16.20 -17.26
OPLEASL - -1.02 -0.95 *
-12.79 -13.31
GROWTH + 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
3.87 4.18 4.08 3.87 4.56 4.15 4.15
R2 0.7247 0.7262 0.7269 0.7259 0.7286 0.7274 0.7272
Observations 9,985 9,985 9,985 9,985 9,985 9,985 9,985
Table 7:
Value Relevance of Operating and Capital Lease Liabilities
 MVE it  = β 0 CONSTANT it  + β 1 BVE it  + β 2 NI it  + β 3 NEG it + β 4 NEGNI it 
     + β 5 CAPLEASL it  + β 6 DEBT it  + β 7 OPLEASL it  + β 8 GROWTH it 
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*  Using a Chi-Square distribution with White-corrected standard errors, the probability that OPLEASL 
and CAPLEASL  are equal is 1.70 percent, the probability that DEBT  and CAPLEASL  are equal is 0.32 
percent, and the probability that DEBT  and OPLEASL  are equal is 26.59 percent.
Fixed-year and fixed-industry effects are included in the model but not reported.  See Table 5 for variable
definitions included in equation three.  Additional variables with tabulated regression results are defined
as follows:
ALLDEBT = long-term debt (DEBT) plus capital lease obligations (CAPLEASL) plus the as-if capitalized
        operating lease liability (OPLEASL )
LEASEDEBT = capital lease obligations (CAPLEASL) plus the as-if capitalized operating lease liability
NONCAPLEASL =  long-term debt (DEBT) plus the as-if capitalized operating lease liability (OPLEASL)
NONOPLEASL = long-term debt (DEBT) plus capital lease obligations (CAPLEASL)
Where necessary, I recompute the BVE  variable to account for varying levels of disaggregation.
Table 7:
Value Relevance of Operating and Capital Lease Liabilities
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Variables N Mean St. Dev. 10 Percent Median 90 Percent
Regression Variables:
MVE 3,384 13.93 15.27 1.24 8.95 33.50
MVE 6,601 15.05 14.13 1.65 10.82 34.30
BVE 3,384 15.31 24.51 0.45 8.63 34.28
BVE 6,601 12.49 17.62 0.51 7.96 28.50
NI 3,384 -1.27 33.53 -2.23 0.09 1.76
NI 6,601 0.11 3.36 -1.55 0.26 1.82
NEG 3,384 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
NEG 6,601 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
NEGNI 3,384 -1.95 33.42 -2.22 0.00 0.00
NEGNI 6,601 -0.62 2.49 -1.55 0.00 0.00
CAPLEASL 3,384 0.36 1.56 0.002 0.05 0.69
CAPLEASL 6,601 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DEBT 3,384 5.29 11.42 0.00 1.25 14.40
DEBT 6,601 4.63 12.09 0.00 0.86 11.66
OPLEASL 3,384 2.87 8.17 0.07 0.66 6.56
OPLEASL 6,601 1.33 3.65 0.05 0.44 3.04
GROWTH 3,384 24.61 43.06 0.93 11.19 61.90
GROWTH 6,601 20.10 31.23 1.04 10.67 47.43
This table presents descriptive statistics of the regression variables for two subsamples of data based on
whether or not firms have capital leases (CAPLEASL ).  Of the 9,985 firm-year observations identified in
Table 2, 3,384 firm-year observations reflect capital lease activity (CAPLEASL  > 0) and 6,601 firm-year 
observations do not.  See variable definitions in Table 5.  All variables are deflated by common shares 
outstanding.  All dollar amounts are in millions.  The differences in the means are statistically insignificant.
Table 8:
Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables Based on Capital Lease Activity
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1 2 3
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Variables Prediction t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic
CONSTANT ? -6.89 5.36 -5.37
-2.44 0.70 -1.72
BVE + 0.86 0.84 0.80
20.95 6.01 17.38
NI + 0.50 0.18 0.99
2.47 0.45 2.78
NEG ? -6.68 -5.12 -5.87
-24.43 -5.27 -15.55
NEGNI - -0.61 -0.16 -1.10
-2.97 -0.33 -3.07
CAPLEASL - -1.59 -2.05 -1.70
-4.86 -3.37 -5.18
DEBT - -0.86 -0.76 -0.81
-17.64 -4.12 -15.55
OPLEASL - -0.81 -0.89 -0.72
-6.22 -6.07 -4.78
CAPOP ? 0.10 3.67 -0.05
0.35 3.84 -0.16
CAPOPLEASL ? -0.22 -0.19 -0.18
-1.67 -1.96 -1.15
GROWTH + 0.03 0.08 0.02
4.22 3.25 3.31
R2 0.7278 0.7085 0.7045
Observations 9,985 600 7,527
CAPOP  = a categorical variable equal to one if CAPLEASL  is positive and zero otherwise
CAPOPLEASL  = interaction variable equal to CAPOP *OPLEASL
Fixed-year and fixed-industry effects are included in the model but not reported.  See Table 5 for variable 
definitions included in equation three.  
This table presents regression results for three robustness tests.  The first test in column one examines 
whether operating leases are priced similarly by firms with and without capital leases.  In the second test, I 
evaluate whether leases for transportation firms, the most lease intensive industry (SIC = 5), are priced 
similarly to the main sample.  Lastly, I assess in the third test whether leases are priced differently in the 
first three years of the sample period than in 2003.  
 MVE it  = β 0 CONSTANT it  + β 1 BVE it  + β 2 NI it  + β 3 NEG it + β 4 NEGNI it 
     + β 5 CAPLEASL it  + β 6 DEBT it  + β 7 OPLEASL it  + β 8 CAPOP it + β 9 CAPOPLEASL it  
     + β 10 GROWTH it  + β 11ΣYEAR it  +  β 12ΣINDUSTRY it  + e it                           
Table 9:
Robustness Tests:  Value Relevance of Operating and Capital Lease Liabilities
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